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Zoning and Land Use Planning
Michael Lewyn*
How Often do Cities Mandate Smart Growth or Green
Building?
Much has been written about the role of government
regulation in facilitating automobile-oriented sprawl. Zoning
codes reduce walkability by articially segregating housing
from commerce, forcing businesses and multifamily landlords
to surround their buildings with parking, and articially
reducing density.1 The “smart growth” movement seeks to
reverse these policies, both through regulation and through
more libertarian, deregulatory policies. The purpose of this
paper is to examine to what extent cities have in fact chosen
the former path, and to discuss the possible side eects of
prescriptive smart growth and green building regulations. In
particular, this paper focuses on attempts to make cities
more pedestrian-friendly (as opposed to smart growth poli-
cies designed to restrict the location of suburban
development).2
This article focuses on the zoning regulations of twenty-
four mid-sized cities (that is, cities with between 500,000
and 1 million residents); I chose this sample because it is
large enough to reect the polices of a reasonably diverse
number of cities, yet small enough to be manageable. In ad-
dition, I focus on three types of regulation: parking, density,
and “green building.”
*Michael Lewyn is an Associate Professor, Touro Law Center. B.A.,
Wesleyan University; J.D., University of Pennsylvania; L.L.M., University
of Toronto. I would like to thank Kip Jackson, my research assistant, and
Emily Washington for their assistance with this paper.
1
See generally Michael Lewyn, A Libertarian Smart Growth Agenda
16-33 (2012).
2
Such “urban containment” is beyond the scope of this paper, in part
because it has been addressed extensively by a wide variety of commenta-
tors. See, e.g., Michael Lewyn, Sprawl, Growth Boundaries and the
Rehnquist Court, 2002 Utah L. Rev. 1 (2002) (discussing Oregon's “urban
growth boundary” system, and citing numerous other papers on point).
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I. Parking
A. The Status Quo
Since the 1940s, local governments have generally required
owners of commercial and multifamily structures to build
o-street parking for customers and visitors.3 Numerous com-
mentators have criticized these regulations, pointing out
that minimum parking requirements have a wide variety of
negative side eects:
E These regulations force landowners to subsidize driving
by forcing them to spend thousands of dollars on park-
ing spaces.4 These costs are not passed on to drivers
because minimum parking requirements articially
increase the supply of parking (thus reducing the mar-
ket price of parking, usually to zero).5 Instead, they are
passed on to society as a whole, forcing all of society to
subsidize parking and thus subsidize driving. And by
encouraging driving, parking requirements increase the
trac congestion and pollution that comes with driving.
E Minimum parking requirements for housing increase
the cost of housing- according to one study, by $85,000
per unit.6
E Minimum parking requirements reduce population
density, because land used for parking cannot be used
for housing, shops or oces. For example, a city that
requires one parking space per one-bedroom apartment
reduces the number of apartments per acre.7 Low-
density areas tend to be highly automobile-dependent;
if only a few houses can be built on a block near public
transit, that means only a few people can walk to such
transit. Similarly, if only a few houses can be built on a
block near a commercial street, only a few people can
walk to the commercial street.
E Minimum parking requirements reduce economic activ-
3
See Donald C. Shoup, The High Cost Of Free Parking 22, 25 (2005).
4
Id. at 185–92 (discussing subsidization of parking caused by mini-
mum parking requirements); Michael Lewyn, What Would Coase Do?
(About Parking Regulation), 22 FORDHAM L. REV. 89, 97 n. 44 (2012)
(costs range from $2000 per parking space to $20,000 per space; costs gen-
erally higher in urban locations).
5
Id. at 97 (“ninety-nine percent of Amerian driving trips end at a




Id. at 101; Shoup, supra note 3, at 143–44 (discussing impact on
density).
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ity, at least in highly urbanized places. In suburbs
where land is cheap, a landowner can build what it
wants and comply with the law by purchasing ad-
ditional land for parking. But in an already-developed
area, a landowner may be hemmed in by other land-
owners, and thus may not be able to build apartments
or stores (at least not to the extent it desires) and still
comply with parking requirements.8
E Minimum parking requirements make walking uncom-
fortable by encouraging landowners to place additional
parking in front of buildings. Zoning laws often require
buildings to be set back far behind a sidewalk- and
where landowners are forced to place something be-
tween sidewalks and buildings, that something is usu-
ally parking, since by doing so they can comply with
parking and setback regulations at the same time.9
Where parking is placed in front of buildings, pedestri-
ans must waste time walking through parking lots, an
unpleasant experience at best. Thus, minimum parking
requirements not only increase driving, but decrease
walking.
B. Parking Maximums as an Alternative
Almost every American municipality has minimum park-
ing requirements for many neighborhoods.10 Parking maxi-
mums, however, are less frequent. Fifteen out of the twenty-
four cities surveyed have some sort of parking maximums.
These fteen cities follow one or more of three strategies: (1)
maximum parking requirements for nearly all uses, (2)
maximums for specied uses, (3) maximums for specied
parts of the city.
1. Universal Rules
Three cities impose maximum parking requirements for
all or nearly all land uses: Fort Worth, Tx., San Francisco,
Ca. and Louisville, Ky. Fort Worth imposes a wide variety of
8
See Lewyn, supra note 4, at 105–06.
9
In addition, customers may nd it more convenient to park in front
of stores- so if a landowner has to spend money on parking, it may be bet-
ter o placing the parking in front regardless of setback rules. Id. at 104.
10
For a comparison of various cities' minimum parking requirements,
See Graphing Parking, at http://www.graphingparking.com (charting
minimums for various land uses). However, a few cities have abolished
minimum parking requirements for downtown neighborhoods or neighbor-
hoods especially well-served by public transit. See Lewyn, supra note 4, at
112–13.
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minimum parking requirements, and adds simply that the
“maximum number of parking spaces shall not exceed 125%
of the minimum parking requirement.”11 For example, the
city requires one parking space per bedroom for multifamily
housing,12 which means the maximum parking requirement
is 1.25 spaces per bedroom. Because the dierence between
Fort Worth's minimum and maximum parking requirements
is so small, it appears that in that city, almost all parking
that is not prohibited is compulsory.
San Francisco also consistently caps parking, but gives
landowners more discretion than Fort Worth. As a general
rule, San Francisco's city code caps parking at “three spaces
where one space is required by this Code; four spaces where
two spaces are required by this Code; 150% of the required
number of spaces where three or more spaces are required
by this Code; and, in all districts other than [neighborhood
commercial], 15 spaces or 7% of the total gross oor area of
the structure or development, whichever is greater, or in
[such] Districts, three spaces, where no o-street parking
spaces are required by this Code.”13 In addition, the city
imposes a variety of stricter requirements for some individ-
ual zoning districts.14
Louisville lists both minimum and maximum requirements
for almost every conceivable land use.15 Generally, its
maximums are about twice its minimums. For example, the
city requires a minimum of 1.5 parking spaces per dwelling
unit in most districts and a maximum of 3 spaces per dwell-
ing unit. For most oces, the city requires a minimum of be-
tween 2 and 2.8 spaces (depending on the zoning district)
per 1000 square feet, and a maximum of 5 spaces.16
2. Maximums for a few uses
Seven cities impose maximum parking requirements for
some or all commercial uses but not for residential uses. For
11
See Fort Worth, Texas, Code, sec. 6.201(b)(2).
12
Id., SEC. 6.201(B). In addition, the city requires one parking space
per 250 square feet of common areas, oces and recreation. Id.
13
San Francisco, Ca. Code, sec. 204.5© (“San Francisco Code”).
14
See sec. 151.1(b) (in certain specied parts of the city, maximum
parking allowed is between 50 and 100 percent of what would otherwise
be minimum amount required, depending on district).
15
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example, El Paso, Tx. imposes both minimums and maxi-
mums for businesses, but only imposes minimum parking
requirements for apartments and other housing. Its maxi-
mums tend to be only slightly higher than its minimums; for
example, an oce must supply a minimum of one space per
480 square feet (or 2.1 per 1000) and a maximum of one per
400 square feet (or 2.5 per 1000).17
Portland, Or.'s rules are similar: the city imposes no
maximum parking requirements for most residential uses,
but imposes both minimums and maximums for most com-
mercial uses.18 However, Portland's maximums tend to be a
bit more generous than those of El Paso. For oce uses,
Portland typically requires about the same minimum
number of parking spaces as El Paso (2 per 1000 square
feet) but sets forth a higher maximum (1 per 294 square
feet, or about 3.4 per 1000). In addition, the city imposes a
variety of requirements for individual neighborhoods. For
example, in areas near light rail stations, a nonresidential
land user may not create more than 150% of the minimum
number of parking spaces required for most zones.19
The Seattle, Wa.code similarly sets forth a maximum in
its commercial zones, providing that in most commercial
zones, businesses may provide no more than 145 spaces per
parking lot.20 In addition, businesses in multifamily zones
may provide no more than 10 parking spaces per
establishment.21
Jacksonville, Fl. imposes parking maximums for most
businesses, providing that oces and businesses (other than
those such as restaurants with specied parking require-
ments of their own) have a minimum of 3 parking spaces per
17
See El Paso, Tx. Code, sec. 20.14.040, App. C, Table 4.09.
18
See generally Portland, Or. Zoning Code, Tables 266-1 and 266–2
(“Portland Code”).
19
Id., sec. 33.450.420(B). See also Tables 510–6, 510–10, 510–16,
536–1 and Secs. 33.532.110(C)(2), 33.536.290(C), 33.555.280(B) (setting
forth special rules for certain neighborhoods).
20
See Seattle, Wa. Code, sec. 23.54.015 ©(2) (applying rule to “all
commercial zones, except C2 zones outside of urban villages”) (“Seattle
Code”).
21
Id., sec. ©(3). In addition, Seattle creates special requirements for
certain zones. Id., secs. 23.48.032 (B) (special rules for mixed use zone);
23.54.015 ©(1) (setting forth special rules for overlay zone near stadium);
23.71.016, Table A (special rules for Northgate Overlay District); 23.75.180
(setting forth special rules for Yesler Terrace community).
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1000 square feet of oor area, and a maximum of 6 per 1000
square feet.22
Columbus, Oh. follows a similar strategy: it imposes mini-
mum parking requirements only for residential, industrial
and institutional uses, but both minimum and maximum
requirements for oces, retail shops and restaurants.
Columbus tends to expect somewhat less parking than
Jacksonville: for example, its minimum requirement for of-
ces is one parking space per 450 square feet (or just over 2
per 1000 square feet) and its maximum requirement is one
space per 250 square feet (or 4 per 1000).23
Milwaukee, Wi. imposes maximum parking requirements
only for a few uses: retail establishments are subject to a
maximum of 3.5 parking spaces per 1000 square feet, and
single-family homes and duplexes are limited to four park-
ing spaces per dwelling unit.24
San Jose, Ca. regulates commercial parking much more
narrowly. As in Columbus and Jacksonville, its parking
minimums are virtually universal; however, it imposes
maximums only for printing and warehouses.25
3. Maximums for a few districts
Another common policy is to impose parking maximums,
but only in certain parts of a city. For example:
E Austin, Tx. imposes parking maximums for two down-
town zoning districts, the Central Business District
(CBD) and Downtown Mixed Use (DMU) districts.26 In
these districts, the maximum parking allowed is 60% of
the minimum parking requirement in a non-downtown
neighborhood.27
E Boston, Ma. limits residential parking in one downtown
zone to 0.75 spaces per unit.28
E San Jose, Ca. creates a “pedestrian-oriented district”
overlay zone. In that zone, multifamily dwellings may
22
Jacksonville Code., secs. 656.604(e)(1) and (f)(1).
23
See Columbus, Ohio Code sec. 3312.49, Table 2 (“Columbus Code”).
24
See Milwaukee, Wi. Code, Table 295-403-2-a (“Milwaukee Code”).
25
See San Jose, Cal. Code Table 20-190 (following sec. 20.90.060).
26
See Austin, Tx. Code, 25-2-100 and 101 (describing districts).
27
Id., sec. 25–6-591(B)(3). I note that a landowner may apply to build
a higher number of spaces. Id., sec, (C). In addition, the minimum parking
requirements is 1/3 of the maximum. Id. sec. (B)(2)(a)(i).
28
See Boston Zoning Code, sec. 27D-8(6)(b)(2) (“Boston Code”).
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create a minimum of 1.25 spaces per dwelling unit and
a maximum of 2 spaces.29
E Denver, Co. limits parking, but only within 1/4 mile of
light rail stations.30 In these areas, surface parking may
not exceed 110 percent of minimum parking
requirements.31
E Albuquerque, NM has created an “East Gateway
Development Plan” for one part of the city.32 In this
area, the maximum parking allowed is the minimum
parking requirement plus 10 percent.33
C. Negative Side Eects
Certainly, a rational basis exists for maximum parking
requirements, especially where (as in Denver) these require-
ments are limited to surface parking. Surface parking makes
walking less convenient, by forcing pedestrians to walk
through parking lots in order to reach destinations. And to
the extent drivers are aware that their destinations will
have ample parking, they are more likely to drive to those
destination, thus creating trac congestion and pollution.
Because maximum parking requirements are generally
quite new in the United States, there is little evidence about
their practical eects.34 But if planners create parking caps
that are lower than the market demand for parking, they
create a variety of problems. First, if a landowner cannot
supply enough parking to meet the demands of its tenants
or customers, those tenants and customers may do their
business elsewhere- perhaps in suburbs with more permis-
29
Id., Table 20-211. Memphis has a similar rule that is essentially
voluntary, since it only applies to landowners who choose to have their
property zoned for a “sustainable subdivision.” See Memphis and Shelby
County Unied Development Code, sec. 3.8.6 (A)(6) (only 20 percent of
surface may be used for surface parking) (“Memphis Code”). However,
other Memphis developments are governed by conventional minimum
parking requirements. Id., sec. 4.6.3.
30
See Denver Zoning Code, sec. 10.4.3.2(B)(1)(a) (“Denver Code”).
31
Id., sec. 10.4.3.2(B)(2). However, underground or aboveground
spaces are not aected by the parking maximum; thus, a landowner may
choose to build an innite number of such spaces. Id., sec. 10.4.3.2(B)(2)(b).
32






See Donald Elliott, A Better Way To Zone 180 (2008) (book written
in 2008 states that “relatively few” cities use parking caps, and those that
do so “generally limit them to downtown or special focus areas”).
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sive parking regulations.35 To quote one commentator: “If a
maximum actually reduces the number of spaces that are
built, it must also reduce the value of the properties that
could be built there. If not, [in the absence of minimum park-
ing requirements] entrepreneurial builders themselves
would build at those rates, once they understood the demand
was there.”36 So if a maximum parking requirement actually
did reduce parking below what customers demanded, they
might, in a weak housing market, increase sprawl by mak-
ing urban housing less desirable.
Moreover, there is some empirical evidence that people
and businesses do value parking in locational decisions. One
British study showed that 15% of businesses consider sta
parking to be a “key inuence” in locational choice (more
than all but one of eleven factors listed), and 11 percent
described customer or visitor parking as a “key inuence”
(more than four of the factors).37 Another survey showed that
when residents of southeast London were given a hypotheti-
cal choice between a garage and more living space, 83% chose
the garage.38
Second, planners must decide whether to apply parking
caps to new construction or to existing construction as well.
If they force landowners to limit parking, they may force
landowners to build nonparking structures, which could pre-
sumably be costly and perhaps even be a taking requiring
government compensation. On the other hand, if only new
construction is governed by a parking cap, new developments
could be placed at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis exist-
ing businesses.39
In sum, it is theoretically possible that maximum parking
requirements, if they are strict enough to reduce parking
below what consumers demand, may make places governed
by those requirements less appealing. However, I have no
35
See Georgina Stylianou, Parking Squeeze In Cbd Annoys, Press,
Oct. 3, 2013 at 1 (discussing developer's complaints about maximum park-
ing requirements in Christchurch, New Zealand).
36
Ben Woolsey, Why We Don't Need A Parking Maximum, at http://se
attletransitblog.com/2009/01/08/why-we-dont-need-a-parking-maximum.
37






See Rogue Valley Council of Governments, Parking Element 9-2, at
http://www.rvcog.org/pdf/PlanningRTPSection9.pdf.
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found no data indicating whether American cities' maximum
parking requirements are strict enough to have this eect.
II. Density
A. The Big Picture
As early as the 1920s, the Standard Zoning Enabling Act
(a federally sponsored model zoning enabling act) stated that
one purpose of zoning should be to “avoid an undue concen-
tration of population.”40 And since then, anti-density regula-
tion has become virtually universal in the United States.41
As early as 1971, eighty percent of the vacant land within 50
miles of Times Square in New York City was restricted to
lots of half an acre or more.42 Since then, zoning has become
more restrictive over time.43 Even in high-density cities such
as New York, zoning aggressively limits density.44
It seems clear that such anti-density regulation does in
fact limit development, especially compact, walkable
development. A study conducted for the Urban Land Institute
asked developers about the impact of zoning on “alternatives
to conventional, low-density, automobile-oriented, suburban
40
U.S. Department Of Commerce, A Standard State Zoning Enabling
Act, sec. 3, at http://www.planning.org/growingsmart/pdf/SZEnablingAct
1926.pdf. This law was a model state statute designed to make it clear
that local governments had the authority to regulate density and land
use. Id., sec. 1.
41
See 3 Edward H. Ziegler, Arden H. Rathkopf, and Daren A.
Rathkopf, Rathkopf's The Law of Zoning and Planning, sec. 51.10 (2011
ed.) (“minimum lot size” requirements common); Norman Williams Jr.
And John M. Taylor, American Land Planning Law, sec. 39.1 (describing
minimum lot size requirements as “most common form of density control”).
42
See Note, Exclusionary Zoning and Equal Protection, 84 Harv. L.
Rev. 1645, 1645 (1971).
43
WILLIAMS AND TAYLOR, supra note 41, sec. 35.23 (“Municipal
zoning ordinances have increasingly been adopting requirements for wide-
spread or almost-universal very low density”); William Fischel, The Evolu-
tion of Homeownership, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1503, 1515 (2010) (To in or-
der to keep out lower classes while avoiding 1970s civil rights litigation,
suburbs avoided discrimination claims by downzoning all land, rather
than merely excluding only housing catering to the truly poor).
44
See City of New York, Zoning Data Tables, Residence Districts, at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/zone/zoninghandbook/zoningdatata
bles.pdf#page=1 (listing density limits for various zoning districts).
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development.”45 78.2% of developers identied government
regulation as a signicant barrier to such development.46
Such regulation is one reason why the average American
neighborhood has only two to seven dwelling units per acre.47
Such low-density areas tend to be highly automobile-
dependent; if only a few houses can be built on a block near
public transit, that means only a few people can walk to
such transit.48
B. Minimum Density Requirements: Rare But Not
Unknown
Critics of smart growth often accuse smart growth advo-
cates of trying to force Americans into higher-density
housing.49 Most cities, however, have nothing resembling a
mandatory, citywide minimum density requirement. In fact,
only two cities have widespread minimum density
regulations.
San Jose has minimum density requirements even for its
low-density zones- but those requirements are quite lenient.
In the city's R-1 (single-family residential) zone, the city al-
lows densities between one and eight units per acre.50 Thus,
the city does impose a minimum density of one house per
acre upon developers- hardly an “urban” level of density.
Most commentators suggest that a neighborhood must have
45
See Jonathan Levine, Zoned Out: Regulation, Markets, and Choices




See Joanna D. Malaczynski and Timothy P. Duane, Reducing
Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Vehicle Miles Traveled: Integrating the
California Environmental Quality Act with the California Global Warming
Solutions Act, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 71, 80 n. 44 (2009) (estimating current
average density at 7.6 units per acre); Mark Fina and Leonard Shabman,
Some Unconventional Thoughts on Sprawl, 23 WILLIAM AND MARY
ENVTL. LAW AND POLICY REV. 739, 741 (1999) (“two units per acre
typical of present development”).
48
See Malaczynski and Duane, supra note 47, at 80 n. 44 (claiming
that raising average density to nine units per acre could reduce vehicle
miles traveled by 30% nationwide).
49
See Kurt Paulsen, Sprawl, Residential Density, and Exclusionary
Zoning, 20 PROBATE AND PROPERTY 23, 27 (2006) (to some, smart
growth proposals are an “attempt by government bureaucrats to force
people to live in higher-density [housing]”); Jim Wooten, Our Opinion:
Suburbs Evil? Evidence Thin, Atlanta Journal-Constitution, June 6, 2004
at E6 (accusing smart growth advocates of “using transportation funding
to force high-density development [and] drive people into urban clusters”).
50
San Jose Code, sec. 20.30.010©(1).
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at least seven to fteen dwelling units per acre to support
signicant public transit ridership, because only such
compact neighborhoods have a critical mass of people living
within walking distance of a bus stop.51 In areas with lower
density, very few people will live within a short walk of a
bus or train stop, and transit ridership will therefore be
low.52
Portland has established minimum density requirements
for numerous residential zones. For example, in its North
Lombard Street zone, the city requires at least one dwelling
unit per 2250 square feet for residential development,53 or
about 20 units per acre. Similarly, the city requires at least
one lot per 2000 square feet in its Albina district for residen-
tial development abutting Martin Luther King Boulevard.54
To be sure, many cities have high-density districts as well
as low-density districts.55 However, the existence of these
districts hardly constitutes a “smart growth”-oriented mini-
mum density requirement, because a division of cities into
higher- and lower-density zones is part of traditional zoning.
In addition, a few cities allow developers to request that
their properties be rezoned as a special pedestrian or transit-
51
See Robert H. Freilich, The Land Use Implications of Transit-
Oriented Development: Controlling the Demand Side of Transportation
Congestion and Urban Sprawl, 30 Urb. Law. 547, 552 & n. 18 (2009);
Anthony Downs, Still Stuck In Trac: Coping With Peak-Hour Trac
Congestion 210 (2004) (seven units per acre supports bus service once
every half-hour).
52
See Pamela Blais, Perverse Cities 60–61 (2010) (citing numerous
studies).
53
See Portland Code, sec. 33.460.120(B). I note, however, that this
requirement only applies to lots under 10,000 square feet. Id. See also id.,
sec. 33.583.240(B) (similar rule applies to St. Johns district).
54
See Portland Code, sec. 33.505.200. See also id., secs. 33.561.240
(requiring similar densities in North Interstate zone); see also sec.
33.610(D) (subdivision regulation providing that minimum density is 2/3
of maximum density in lowest-density zone).
55
See Indianapolis, In. Code 731-213 (city creates suburban high-rise
zone, and species range of densities that are “typical” depending on
apartment height; for example, 12–22 units per acre “typical” for one to
three story structures); Albuquerque, NM Code, sec. 14–16-3–2 (7)(b)
(creating minimum density of 12 units per acre for mixed-use develop-
ment).
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oriented zone; these zones typically include minimum
densities.56
Thus, it appears that urban regulation of density gener-
ally continues to follow the traditional pattern of American
zoning: to mandate less density rather than more. As noted
above, anti-density regulation is virtually universal in the
United States.57 In fact, even Portland and San Jose have
maximum density requirements for every residential zone,
including multifamily zones.58
C. Negative Side Eects Of Minimum Density
Requirements
Because minimum density requirements are relatively
new and rare, there is little empirical evidence as to their
eects. Ideally, minimum density requirements would
encourage development that is compact enough to support
public transit and to support placing stores and employers
within walking distance of housing.
But in theory, minimum density requirements could deter
development: if the city requires 10 units per acre in zone X
and a developer cannot nd enough prospective homeowners
to ll those units, the developer will be unwilling to build in
zone X. It follows that an overly restrictive minimum density
requirement in a walkable area could actually encourage
sprawl by discouraging development in that area, causing
developers to build in sprawling suburbs instead. However,
56
See Boston Code, Art. 87–3 and 87–7 (landowner may ask city to
create “Smart Growth Overlay District”; as part of rezoning, city will es-
tablish minimum and maximum densities); Jacksonville Code sec.
656.1402–1404 (creating “transit-oriented development” zone for areas
near bus stops, if developers request such zoning and comply with criteria);
Columbus Code secs. 3320.13 and 3320.19 (landowner can ask to have
land rezoned to “traditional neighborhood” district with minimum densi-
ties; not directly suggesting maximum lot sizes, but proposing appropriate
lot width and depth); Memphis Code, sec. 3.8.6(A)(5) (requiring minimum
density of seven units per acre for optional “sustainable subdivision”). In
addition, Seattle recently enacted temporary minimum density require-
ments for certain pedestrian-oriented neighborhoods. See Seattle Depart-
ment of Planning and Development, Minimum Density, at http://www.seat
tle.gov/dpd/codesrules/changestocode/minimumdensity/whatwhy/default.ht
m(legislation in eect while city planning department drafting permanent
rules).
57
See supra notes 40–46 and accompanying text.
58
See PORTLAND CODE, CH. 33-610, TABLES 610.1 AND 610.2;
SEC. 33.611.200(B), CH. 33–612, TABLE 612–1; SAN JOSE CODE,
TABLE 20–60 (imposing minimum lot sizes for a wide range of districts,
including multifamily districts).
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it is not known whether existing requirements in fact
discourage development, or whether they are roughly simi-
lar to what a free market would produce in the absence of
such regulations.
Even developers that can protably comply with minimum
density requirements might do so in ways that impede
walkability. For example, a developer might, in the absence
of a density target, build a few houses on a set of gridded
streets, and then seek to comply with the minimum density
requirement by adding additional houses on cul-de-sacs.59
Cul-de-sacs actually reduce walkability, because in subdivi-
sions dominated by cul-de-sac streets, residents cannot visit
their neighbors without going out of their way to a neighbor-
hood “main” street.60
In addition, any minimum density requirement should not
be applied too strictly to existing uses. For example, suppose
A buys a 5,000 square foot single-family house in a neighbor-
hood now zoned for a minimum of twenty units per acre (and
thus for a maximum lot size of roughly 2000 square feet). If
A's house burns down, he would have to sell half his land
and possibly build a much smaller house in order to comply
with the zoning ordinance- arguably an intrusive, if not
downright absurd, result.
Most zoning codes allow “nonconforming uses” (that is,
uses valid when a zoning code is enacted, but which are
outlawed by a code amendment) to continue.61 However, some
codes provide that if a building occupied by a nonconforming
use is signicantly damaged, the building may not be
restored for the nonconforming use.62 If A lives in a city
governed by such a code, A could not continue the noncon-
forming use, and instead would have to sell half his property
and build the smaller house. Assuming that this is an unde-
sirable result, municipalities enacting minimum density
requirements should be lenient towards nonconforming low-
density buildings, and should allow them to continue even if
they are damaged or destroyed.
59
See Kenneth J. Dueker, Mandated Density: the Blunt Instrument of
Smart Growth, at http://americandreamcoalition.org/landuse/mandate.pdf.
60
See Brian W. Ohm and Robert J. Sitkowski, The Inuence of New
Urbanism on Local Ordinances: The Twilight of Zoning?, 35 Urb. Law.
783, 792 (2003), (cul-de-sacs “force the major circulation pattern of a com-
munity onto a few major roads”).
61
See John R. Nolon And Patricia E. Salkin, Land Use And Sustain-
able Development Law: Cases And Materials 203 (8th ed. 2012).
62
See Moatt v. Forrest City, 234 Ark. 12, 350 S.W.2d 327 (1961).
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III. Green Building
By contrast, American cities have been more willing to ex-
periment with “green building” regulations designed to
require energy eciency. Only three of the 24 cities surveyed
require private developers to comply with green building
standards. However, many other cities give incentives to the
private sector for green building, or require that city-owned
buildings follow green building principles.63
A. The most restrictive cities
San Francisco has one of the most aggressive green build-
ing programs. Rather than merely incorporating a third-
party's rating system, San Francisco's building code ad-
dresses a wide variety of environmental details.64 For
example:
* the city's code provides that even small residential
buildings must achieve a 75-point score from the Build
It Green “Greenpoints” checklist.65
* High-rise buildings must have either a similar score or
must achieve a “Silver” rating under the Leadership in
Energy and Environment Design (LEED) guidelines
enacted by the U.S. Green Building Council.66 In addi-
tion, such buildings must also meet specied guidelines
for reducing indoor water use, management of construc-
tion debris, and stormwater management.67
* Major alterations of residential buildings must meet the
same Greenpoints/LEED goals as high-rises, and must
also use low-emitting paints, adhesives, and carpets.68
Nonresidential buildings are subject to similar
restrictions.69 For example, new large commercial buildings
63
I note that such regulations are not limited to local government.
See Kaleb Keller, Leeding In The Wrong Direction: Addressing Concerns
With Today's Green Building Policy, 85 U.S.C. L. Rev. 1377, 1385, 1387–89
(2012) (describing use of similar standards at state and federal levels).
Darren A. Prum and Tetsuo Kobayashi, Green Building Geography Across
the United States: Does Governmental Incentives or Economic Growth
Stimulate Construction?, 43 Real Estate L.J. 5, 16-20 (2014).
64
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must achieve LEED Gold certication,70 and must also meet
guidelines reducing indoor water use, construction debris,
and energy use, as well as guidelines related to renewable
energy, indoor air quality, and use of low-emission construc-
tion materials.71
San Jose also incorporates LEED guidelines.72 Large com-
mercial projects must receive LEED certication,73 as must
high-rise residential projects.74 Large residential projects
other than high-rises must receive either LEED certication
or GreenPoint certication from the “Build It Green”
organization.75
Similarly, Boston incorporates LEED guidelines, but only
for large projects.76 Such projects must be eligible for LEED
certication.77 Boston's rules are more lenient than San
Jose's, insofar as they dene “large” projects more narrowly:
in San Jose, any commercial project of over 25,000 square
feet is governed by green building rules,78 while Boston's
threshold is 50,000–100,000 square feet (depending on the
type of development).79
Austin's code provides that major commercial buildings80




Id., secs. 13.C.5.103-1.2-1.9. See also Secs. 13.C.5.103-2 (rules govern-
ing new mid-sized commercial buildings), and 13.C.5.103–3 (rules govern-
ing alterations of existing commercial buildings).
72
See San Jose Code, sec. 17.84.114.
73
Id., sec. 17.84.220 (B) (“tier two” commercial/industrial projects
must have “LEED Silver” certication); 17.84.121 (dening “tier two” proj-




Id., sec. 17.84.220 (B) (“tier two” residential project must receive
“the minimum green building certication of LEED Certied or GreenPoint
Rated”); 17.84.107 (describing GreenPoint); 17.84.121 (“tier two” project is
“large” project); 17.84.113 (“large” residential project is one with over 10
units that is not a high-rise building).
76
See Boston Zoning Code, arts. 37B (green building provisions apply
only to “large” projects as dened in Art. 80B) and 80B2 (to be governed
by “large project” rules, projects must generally be 50–100,000 square feet




See San Jose Code, sec. 17.84.112
79
Boston Code, art. 80B2 (1, 2).
80
That is, commercial, non-oce uses that (a) are either national
chains, or (b) are over 10,000 square feet, or (c) are being converted from
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and adds that these points may be obtained either through
getting a one- or two-star “green building” rating from the
city, or through other design features unrelated to green
building.81
B. Incentives, Not Requirements
Half a dozen cities that do not require green building, but
give builders incentives for such construction. For example:
E Jacksonville's code provides that regulatory applica-
tions by landowners with green certication shall be
given priority over other applications.82
E Seattle provides “density bonuses” (that is, allows more
density than would otherwise be permissible under the
zoning code) to developers in residential and mixed-use
zones (and even some industrial areas as well) who earn
a LEED Silver rating.83
E Memphis, Tn. and Louisville apply green building
principles to optional “sustainability” zones. In Mem-
phis's “sustainable subdivision” zone, 10 percent of the
square footage must be LEED-certied.84 Similarly,
Louisville gives developers a “sustainable permit”
designation if half their square footage meets the stan-
dards of LEED or other green building organizations.85
Indianapolis, In. and Las Vegas, Nv. are even more
lenient, reducing or rebating permitting fees for certied





See Jacksonville Code sec. 327.106(a). These applications include
applications for regulatory review of site plans, plat approval, and vari-
ances.
83
See Seattle Code, secs. 23.45.526 (A) (residential zones),
23.48.011(E) (mixed use zone); 23.49.011(A)(2)(m) (downtown mixed-use
zone); 23.50.033(B) (one industrial zone). The above discussion is focused
on zoning-related incentives; I note, however, that direct subsidies may be
common as well. See, e.g, Milwaukee Energy Eciency, at http://www.sma
rtenergypays.com/.
84
Memphis Code, sec. 3.8.6(9).
85
Louisville Land Development Code, Ch 1 Part 2 (“sustainable
permit project” is one in which 50 percent of square footage in structured
certied either by LEED, Green Globes or Energy Star), Chapters 5.3.2
and 9.1.3(F)(8) (developers may built at greater heights and provide fewer
parking spaces for such projects).
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green building projects.86 Similarly, Columbus reimburses
the costs of LEED certication.87
C. City Buildings
Eight cities require green building, but only for city-owned
buildings rather than for the private sector. For example,
Jacksonville requires that new city buildings or major
renovations of existing city buildings obtain some kind of
green certication88-either from LEED or from another
certifying agency.89 Modications to city buildings are
governed by similar rules if those modications aect more
than 50 percent of a building's square footage. Denver, Albu-
querque and Nashville have similar rules.90 Seattle and
Portland go slightly further, requiring a LEED Gold rating
for new city buildings and large-scale renovations, as well as
related environmental improvements such as reduced energy
and water use.91
Washington, D.C. also requires LEED certication for ma-
86
See Indianapolis, In. Code, sec. 536–621; City of Las Vegas, City of
Las Vegas Launches Updated Green Building Program, at http://www.lasv
egasnevada.gov/Publications/19434.htm.
87
City of Columbus, Green Columbus Fund, at http://econdev.columbu
s.gov/contenttwocolumn.aspx?id=40383.
88
See Jacksonville Code, secs. 327.102(a) (new buildings) and (b)
(renovations aecting more than 50 percent of existing building's square
footage).
89
Id., sec. 327.103 (certication may be from Green Building Institute,
Florida Green Building Coalition, or other certication systems approved
by city).
90
See John W. Hickenlooper, Executive Order No. 123, sec. 2.0 at
http://usgbccolorado.org/metro/documents/DenverEO123.pdf (new city
buildings and major renovations shall meet LEED Silver standard, and
also receive Energy Star certication; other capital improvement projects
shall follow “LEED principles”); Metro Government of Nashville and
Davidson County, Tennessee, Code of Ordinances, sec. 16.60.050 (mandat-
ing LEED Silver certication for “projects which exceed ve thousand
gross square feet of occupied space or for which the total project cost
exceeds two million dollars.”); Albuquerque, New Mexico Code of Ordi-
nances, sec. 3.9.3(A) (“All city building construction projects and major
remodels over 5,000 square feet, with a 341,300 BTU per hour connected
energy load or with a 50 kilowatt or greater service capacity” shall receive
LEED Silver certication).
91
See Brennon Staley and Sandra Mallory, DPD Sustainable Build-
ing Policy sec. 4.1, at http://www.seattle.gov/dpd/GreenBuilding/docs/dpdp
021677.pdf; City of Portland, City of Portland Green Building Policy, at ht
tp://www.portlandoregon.gov/bps/article/243213. Portland goes a bit
further still, requiring existing city buildings to “pursue” LEED Silver
certication.
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jor city-owned and nanced commercial projects,92 and an-
other form of green certication for city-owned and nanced
residential projects.93 But Washington goes a little further,
also applying LEED green building standards to privately-
owned land sold by the city to a private entity.94 Similarly,
Baltimore requires LEED Silver certication (or comparable
design standards) not only for city projects, but also for city-
subsidized buildings.95
D. Disadvantages of Green Building Ordinances
Regulations that mandate green building (either for city-
owned buildings or for private developers) may reduce long-
term energy costs and create positive externalities, insofar
as reductions in energy use lead to reductions in pollution.96
On the other hand, green certication may impose short-run
costs on developers and taxpayers; one law review article
estimates that LEED certication (the most widely used
form of green certication) adds between 4 and 11 percent to
total construction cost.97 So if a city requires such certica-
tion and its suburbs do not, development in the city could
become more expensive, thus encouraging developers and
their customers to do business in suburbia.
Additionally, requiring LEED certication creates a
technical problem for builders and city ocials. A building
cannot achieve LEED certication until it is substantially
complete.98 But if a building must achieve LEED certication
to be occupied, that creates a risk that it could be completed,
fail to achieve LEED certication, and thus be completely
92
See District of Columbia Code, sec. 6-1451.02 (a)(2) (nonresidential
projects over 10,000 square feet must meet standards for LEED Silver
Certication, as well as numerous other Environmental Protection Agency
standards).
93
Id. (a)(3) (residential projects over 10,000 square feet must meet
Enterprise Community Partners “Green Communities standard, or a
substantially similar standard”).
94
Id., 6–1451.03(b)(1). Projects receiving a city subsidy are subject to
this standard if less than 15 percent of the project was nanced by the
city; projects with higher city subsidies are treated as city-owned prop-
erty.
95
City of Baltimore, Building, Fire and Related Codes, sec. 3705.
96
See Sarah B. Schindler, Following Industry's Leed: Municipal
Adoption of Private Building Industry Standards, 62 FLA. L. REV. 285,
296–98 (2010) (describing some of the local externalities that green build-
ing designed to combat).
97
See Keller, supra note 63, at 1385.
98
See NOLON & SALKIN, supra note 61, at 937.
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useless. This risk in turn could make it dicult for develop-
ers to achieve nancing, because a lender or investor will
not wish to invest in a building if a certicate of occupancy
is at risk.99
This problem is not insoluble- but all the solutions involve
costs. For example, Seattle uses a penalty-based system to
address situations where buildings fail to meet green certi-
cation obligations. If a building fails to achieve LEED certi-
cation, the city will not compel it to be vacated; instead, the
city will merely impose a nancial penalty upon the
developer.100 But this solution creates its own risks: the more
modest the penalty for failing to achieve LEED certication,
the less aggressively a developer will pursue it.
Finally. the environmental impact of LEED may not
always be completely positive. For example, LEED certica-
tion tends to favor buildings tightly sealed from the outside;
however, such buildings may have worse indoor air quality.101
LEED also allows developers to obtain water quality points
for creating synthetic turf instead of grass; however, such
turf may contain lead and other toxins.102
IV. Conclusion
Most mid-sized cities have used regulation to make build-
ings more environmentally friendly, both through “smart
growth”-oriented regulations and through “green building”
regulations. Both types of regulation are environmentally
benecial at rst glance. However, more study may be
needed as to their potential side eects.
For example, a maximum parking requirement in an
intown neighborhood may, by reducing the number of park-
ing lots, make the neighborhood more pedestrian-friendly,
less polluted, and less congested with trac. But if the
regulation is too restrictive and is not universally adopted,
businesses and their customers may shun the neighborhood
and move to areas with more parking. If the alternative lo-
cation is generally a more automobile-dependent area, such
regulations may make the city or region more automobile-
dependent as a whole.






See Keller, supra note 63, at 1404–05 (noting that LEED also gives
points for indoor air quality, mitigating this concern).
102
Id. at 1405.
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increasing density, make a neighborhood more pedestrian-
and transit-friendly. But if a city wants more density than
developers are willing to build, and nearby areas lack simi-
lar restrictions, the city may get no density at all, as develop-
ers stampede into more permissive suburbs.
Green building requirements may create the same risk:
when a city increases the costs of doing business, it risks
encouraging development to move into other cities or to
suburbs- and if those places are more auto-oriented, develop-
ment may shift to such auto-oriented places, thus causing an
increase in driving and in pollution.
Regulation designed to force smarter, more environmen-
tally friendly growth may be subject to an uncomfortable
trade-o: if regulations are only slightly more restrictive
than what an unregulated market might produce, they might
not do very much good. But if regulations are signicantly
more restrictive, they might encourage development to shift
to less environmentally sensitive municipalities.
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